The 2008 Protests in Tibet : Main Facts & Analysis by Mills, Martin
The 2008 Protests in Tibet: Main Facts & Analysis 
(Prepared by Cross‐Party Group on Tibet ‐ 6th April 2008) 
Introduction 
Between 10-12 March 2008, on the anniversary of the March 1959 Tibetan Uprising (see ‘Historical 
Backgound’) ,peaceful demonstrations were carried out by monks of the major Buddhist monasteries of 
Lhasa, capital city of Tibet, to call for the ending of state restrictions on religious practice in the region. Some 
spontaneous slogans also called for “free Tibet” and a return of the 14th Dalai Lama to Tibet. Reports speak 
of these early protests being subdued with beatings, teargas and the cutting off of water and food supplies 
by the Chinese Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) in the city, rumours of which brought out many Buddhist laity in 
defence of protesting monks on 14th March. These lay protests on the 14th involved a full-scale confrontation 
between local Tibetans and the state authorities; the three-hour long withdrawal of security forces from the 
city centre then saw widespread looting and burning of Chinese shops in Lhasa. This conflict involved the 
indiscriminate beating and perhaps killing of Chinese civilians: according to the Chinese Xinhua news 
agency, at least 18 died in beatings or in fires, and one policeman was killed; Tibetan exiled sources claim 
80 people were shot dead when PAP finally moved in to reclaim the city, although this figure is 
unconfirmed. As news of the earlier protests spread throughout ethnic Tibet, other demonstrations began 
across Central Tibet, and in the neighbouring regions of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan, prompting a swift and 
draconian clampdown by the Chinese 
authorities, and the widespread 
shooting and arrest of demonstrators 
across the region. The closing of 
Tibetan areas to all tourists and foreign 
media has ensured that little in the way 
of news is now getting out: estimates at 
the end of March place the number of 
dead outside Lhasa at between 50-150, 
and the number of those arrested so far 
at approximately 2500.  
Where were the protests? 
The Boundaries of Tibet 
Historical and cultural Tibet comprises five regions: Ū & Tsang (Central 
Tibet), Ngari (Western Tibet), and Kham and Amdo (Eastern Tibet). The 
first three of these areas are presently designated the ‘Tibetan 
Autonomous Region’ (TAR) by the PRC, largely because they 
constituted the limits of the independent rule of the Dalai Lama’s 
government at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1950 and were thus 
given special status by Mao. The other two regions, Kham and Amdo, 
had previously been incorporated under Chinese rule, and thus – 
while being designated Tibetan Minorities Areas – do not have 
‘autonomous’ status. Instead, they are regulated as parts of the 
existing Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan. 
As can be seen from the mapi, the 
overwhelming majority of protests have 
occurred outside the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region, in the ethnically-
Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu and 
Sichuan provinces (see ‘The Boundaries 
of Tibet’). The distribution of protests is 
indicative: while the North and West of 
Tibet are both comparatively 
unpopulated and have little access to 
media, the protests seem 
overwhelmingly concentrated in those 
regions of Central and Eastern Tibet 
which have seen the most systematic 
economic sinification and state control 
(especially of religion) in recent years. 
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Who are the protesters? 
Historical Background to the Protests 
Tibet was incorporated into the Peoples’ Republic of 
China in 1950, when the region – which had declared 
independence from Chinese imperial rule in 1913 – 
was invaded by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
After a brief military conflict in Eastern Tibet, Tibet’s 
small and ill-equipped army collapsed in the face of 
overwhelming odds. Between 1950 and 1959, the 
Dalai Lama’s government (called the Ganden 
P’odrang) was allowed to continue in reduced form, 
and communist reforms in Central Tibet were put on 
hold by Mao’s government in light of the ‘special 
conditions’ of the region (see ‘Boundaries of Tibet’).  
However from 1956 onwards, communist reforms in 
Eastern Tibetan (including the destruction of Buddhist 
temples & monasteries, class reforms and the 
‘struggling of class enemies’ such as landowners, 
monks and nuns) led to violent uprisings against 
Chinese rule, led by the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ 
guerrilla movement. By 1959, a growing flood of 
refugees from Eastern Tibet, deteriorating relations 
between the Dalai Lama’s government and the PLA, 
and runaway inflation all served to create 
widespread sympathy for the Eastern Tibetan 
insurrection in Central Tibet. When rumours of a 
potential kidnap plot against the Dalai Lama 
circulated in Lhasa on the 10 March 1959, ordinary 
Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama’s summer palace 
(Norbulingka) in their tens of thousands, leading to a 
full-scale (if unequal) armed conflict between 
Tibetans in Central Tibet and the occupying Chinese 
forces, and the flight of the present 14th Dalai Lama 
into exile in India along with some 80,000 other 
Tibetans .  
In the wake of the 1959 Uprising, the PLA carried out 
widespread reprisals in Central and Eastern Tibet 
(internal PLA documents from 1960 place the number 
of Tibetans killed and executed in the 3-month wake 
of the 10 march at 87,000), and Central Tibet’s 
‘special status’ was revoked. Full-scale ‘democratic 
reforms’ were instituted, followed in the early 1960s by 
Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward and, between 
1966 and 1976, the Cultural Revolution. Only with the 
death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 
1976 did policy change occur in Tibet, with the 
economic and cultural liberalizations of 1979. Despite 
growing prosperity, however, protests broke out 
across Central Tibet between 1987-9, followed by the 
imposition of martial law. Since then, new policies 
have been introduced in Tibet intensifying control of 
religious and political thought and expression (see 
‘Causes’). 
 
As with previous widespread unrest in 1987-9 (see 
‘Historical Background’), the 2008 protests in Tibet 
began in Lhasa by the monks of the ‘Three Great Seats’, 
Lhasa’s old monastic universities. The involvement of 
laity from the 14th onwards has, however, massively 
diversified this picture: while Buddhist monks and nuns 
remain at the heart of the peaceful protests, the rioting 
clearly involved traders, labourers and shopkeepers. 
Other,peaceful protests were staged elsewhere by 
teachers, university students, even schoolchildren. In this 
respect, the protests appear to focus a wide diversity of 
grievances, and an equally wide cross-section of 
political opinion in Tibet: concerns over religious 
restrictions and forced ideological education have 
combined with economic grievances which have seen 
some poorer Tibetans increasingly marginalized in 
China’s boom economy (see ‘Causes of the protests’),  
generating profound inter-ethnic tensions. Certain 
Chinese intellectuals have expressed sympathy over a 
perceived return by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to ‘cultural revolution’-style tactics and slogans. It 
is indicative of the depth of feeling in the region that 
even those few government-stipended monks (whose 
political credentials are most thoroughly checked, and 
who are widely regarded as ‘monks for show’) used a 
carefully-staged international media conference at the 
Jokhang temple in central Lhasa on 27th March, as an 
opportunity to protest, despite the clear threat to their 
own welfare. 
It is difficult to reduce all of these groups down to a 
single political agenda: certainly they cannot 
necessarily be understood as primarily ‘splittist’ or 
secessionist in the way the Chinese authorities 
apparently understand them. Whilst some of the more 
Chinese-educated Tibetans involved may be counted 
as ‘Tibetan nationalist’ (that is, their primary concern is 
with realising a ‘Tibetan nation’ as a sovereign entity), 
most - especially among the monastic population - are 
primarily religious loyalists, while others are simply part of 
that growing cohort of the dispossessed within the PRC’s 
profoundly uneven economic and political resurgence. 
The Tibetan protests of 2008 therefore appear to be 
both more widespread and more intense than those 
that preceded them between 1987-9, despite twenty 
years of government policies specifically designed to 
integrate Tibet more thoroughly into the PRC, and to 
ensure no repeat of the 1980s protests. As the Chinese 
intellectual Wang Lixiong commented of Tibet in 2002: 
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Tibet is more prosperous now than ever before in its history. However, this has not gained the PRC the 
allegiance of the Tibetans, more and more of whom have become attached to the Dalai Lama… It 
would be wrong to regard the present situation as more stable than in 1987 [when the Lhasa protests 
first occurred]. At that time, it was mainly monks and disoriented youth who led the riots. Nowadays, 
opposition lurks among cadres, intellectuals, state employees. In the words of one retired official: 
'The current stabilization is only on the surface. One day people will riot in much greater numbers 
than in the late eighties' ii 
Causes of the Protests 
On the 14 March 2008, the authorities in charge of the Tibetan autonomous region declared that they had 
significant evidence that the protests were masterminded by ‘splittists’ in league with the ‘Dalai clique’, 
shorthand for the 14th Dalai Lama’s Tibetan government-in-exile (TGIE), located in Dharamsala, India. As yet, 
this evidence has not been made available to the international community, and even if it were true then 
this could not explain the sheer ubiquity and social breadth of the protests reported. In examining the 
protests, academics and Tibet specialists have identified three principal areas of conflict that could more 
adequately explain the uprisings: 
• Growing state restrictions on religious freedoms: Since the early 1990s, the Religious Affairs Bureau 
and other sections of the CCP] have issued increasingly restrictive regulations on the practice of 
religion in the Peoples’ Republic of China, with a direct effect on monastic institutions and religious 
life in Tibet. These include in particular: a reduction of the definition of legal religion to those 
traditions that came within the compass of close state control; the limiting of the size of religious 
establishments; the state vetting and registration of who may become a monk or nun; the state 
control of the selection and training of religious leaders; restrictions on the construction of public or 
outdoor religious monuments and buildings; the forbidding of religious membership to government 
employees and, their close relatives; forbidding of monastic membership to those with histories of 
political dissidence; the close control of daily religious activities in individual monasteries through a 
state-appointed Democratic Management Committeeiii. Since the early 2000s, these new 
regulations has been used as a basis for the demolition of several prominent Tibetan monasteries in 
Eastern Tibet (such as Yachen Gar, Baiyul County, and Larung Gar in Gandze province in 2001, 
which had over 8000 Buddhist adherents in residence) and religious monuments (such as the statue 
of Guru Rinpoche, one of the founders of Tibetan Buddhism, in Samye monastery, Lhokha, in 
February 2008). At the same time, the recent “Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living 
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism”, implemented in September 2007, asserted complete state control 
over the search for, discovery, and ratification of Tibetan reincarnating lamas (including the 
influential Dalai, Panchen and Karmapa lamas), a right traditionally reserved for the immediate 
disciples of those lamas.  
• Intensified ideological and military control: In response to the 1987-9 protests in Tibet, the CCP’s 1994 
Third Forum on Work on Tibet asserted the need to closely control the ideological and political 
education of monks and nuns in Tibet. This was accompanied by a ‘Strike Hard’ campaign, and was 
attended by new policies forbidding the display of photographs of, or worship of, the Dalai Lama 
throughout the PRC; literature by him was already forbidddeniv. At the heart of these was the 
‘patriotic education’ campaign, an intensive process of political indoctrination designed to instill in 
monks and nuns a ‘fine tradition of patriotism’, a ‘love of the nation as the basis of a love of religion’, 
and a recognition that ‘Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times, and all plots to split off 
Tibet will fail”. A defining component of this process was the necessity for monks and nuns to openly 
denounce the Dalai Lama, which was one of the principal criteria of examination and the political 
vettingv. This process was stepped up in late 2005. In the latter months of 2007, control of monastic 
life was intensified, with contingents of Peoples’ Armed Police being drafted in to ensure order 
during all religious days and Buddhist teachings, and the forbidding of communal prayer meetings 
and performance of incence offerings. To these could be added the issue of the authorities’ modus 
operandi in responding to the initial monastic protests. Just as monks and nuns of the Tibetan 
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Buddhist tradition see their spiritual welfare as deriving very much from their religious teachers, or 
lamas (including the Dalai Lama), so too do Buddhist laity in the region see their own welfare as 
depending upon the members of the monastic tradition. 
• Economic and educational inequalities: Whilst enacting these regulations, the PRC government 
provides almost no financial assistance to Tibetan religious organisations, which is left to the monks. 
Restrictions on the number of monk allowed in Tibetan monasteries tend to mean that those that are 
allowed spend most of their efforts on the upkeep of buildings, with little opportunity for religious 
study. Tourism regulations also mean that monastery guides must read and write Mandarin Chinese 
fluently, a rare quality amongst Tibetans given the dismal condition of state education in the region. 
Similarly, while Tibetans are allowed to enter the state bureaucracy, the necessary education in one 
of the PRC’s universities is practically open to very few (in 1990, only 0.57% of Tibetans had a 
university degree). In this regard, many Tibetans see themselves as economically marginalized, sitting 
on the sidelines of someone else’s boom economy. The huge influx of Han and Hui traders into the 
TAR alone (capitalizing on its estimated 4.63 million tourist visitors per annum) has led to Tibetans 
becoming a minority population in key cities such as Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo. Much of the 
expansion of this sector – in Lhasa especially – has occurred without state regulation, and has 
increased exponentially since the completion of the Qinghai-Lhasa rail link. It was these incoming 
traders and other economic migrants that bore the brunt of the lay-dominated riots that spread 
through Lhasa on 14 March. 
Most of these policies have been intensified over the last 24 months, since the inauguration of Zhang Qingli 
as Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Committee, a known hardliner who was posted to the region after 
successes dealing with seperatism in the PRC’s troubled Xinjiang region, to the north of Tibet. 
Preliminary Conclusions: 
While reliable information remains scarce as to numbers (particularly in terms of arrests and causalties), the 
following preliminary conclusions may be drawn from what information is available: 
1. There is little evidence to support the conclusion that such widespread protests were, or could have 
been, organised from the outside (specifically by the ‘Dalai clique’). 
2. Peaceful protests were started by monks as a consequence of greivances over state restrictions on 
religion, but quickly spread to laity, where demonstrations dissolved into riots with strong economic 
and ethnic dimensions. These two generally involved fundamentally different kinds of protest, for 
different reasons. 
3. While many protesters called for ‘freedom’ (Tibetan, rangwong) and ‘independence’ (rangtsen), 
the evidence suggests that these protests were largely responses to state policies within Tibetan 
areas - policies on religion, trade, tourism, etc., especially over the last 12-24 months – rather than 
direct moves in favour of secession. Ironically, some of these policies may have been implemented 
primarily to ensure the absence of protest in the region prior to the politically-sensitive Olympics. 
4. In comparsion with earlier protests in the 1980s, the 2008 unrest was both more widespread, more 
intense, and showed a greater tendency to (largely disorganised, mob-based) violence. In this 
regard, it clearly signalled a weakening of moral control by figures such as the Dalai Lama, who has 
always advocated non-violent protest. 
 
i Source: International Campaign for Tibet, verified against Chinese news reports. 
ii Wang Lixiong. “Reflections on Tibet”. New Left Review, 14: March-April 2002. 
iii US Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2002: China.  
iv Human Rights Watch. Cutting Off the Serpent’s Head: Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-5. HRW, March 1996. 
v Tibet Information Network. A Sea of Bitterness: Patriotic Education in Qinghai Monasteries.London, 1999. 
